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ABSTRACT
Current efforts started in 2012 by the Association for
Psychological Science (APS) appear to be different from previous
arguments against null hypothesis statistical testing (NHST),
which remained largely rhetorical without specific actions for
compliance by researchers in psychology. The APS advocacy
involves specific promising implementation tactics. The present
study examined the impact of those efforts on replication and
statistical reporting practices in four psychology journals from
2011 and 2015. The results showed that amidst increased report-
ing of NHST statistics in 2015 compared to 2011 and an absence
of power reporting in the behavioral journals, there was
increased reporting of actual replications in Psychological
Science, paradoxically surpassing Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior, of CIs in all four journals, and of error bars
on graphs in Cognition and Behavioural Processes. These trends
suggest need for additional efforts at propagating the APS initia-
tives to ensure greater impact in the broader psychological com-
munity. Additionally, psychologists from all domains need to
become advocates of best practices for sustainable impact.
Many introductory psychology textbooks open by describing the various approaches and
perspective in psychology. They often conclude that the common thread that holds the
various parts together is research method and the goals of the discipline as a science (e.g.,
Bernstein, Penner, Clarke-Stewart, & Roy, 2007; Griggs, 2017; see also Myer & Dewall,
2017). It is alarming and disheartening, therefore, to find that the field is embroiled in what
amounts to a methodology crisis. The crisis has been brewing for decades now. There have
beenmany warning calls from various people, both within and outside the field, about what
is wrong with our research practices, most especially concerning excessive reliance on null
hypothesis statistical testing (NHST) and the attendant publication bias (e.g., Bohannon,
2014; Fidler, Thomason, Cumming, Finch, & Leeman, 2004). Publication bias is just one
part of Townsend’s twin problems of persistent biases in psychology, the other being “the
heavy bias against replication” (2008, p. 4) stemming from prejudicial treatment of direct
replications by publication editors. There has been, also, a variety of replication failures of
important psychological research (e.g., Alcock, 2011; Bem, 2011; Cesario, 2014; Ritchie,
Wiseman, & French, 2012). This is the backdrop against which one maps the research
terrain in psychological science. A focal point of criticism besides the blind adoption of
NHST, of course, is the pervasivemisinterpretations of what the p-value represents, ranging
from the misconception that it indicates an amount of certainty or confidence about the
results of an experiment to the mistaken belief that it signifies replicability upon repetition
of an experiment (Lambdin, 2012). Editors, reviewers, and authors commonly fall victim to
suchmisconceptions, inadvertently contributing to publication bias, and further weakening
the cumulative foundation of the science of psychology.
Broadly speaking, two disparate research approaches, namely, large-N group designs,
with their various complexities, and single-subject (Gast & Ledford, 2014; Sidman, 1960;
henceforth, small-N) designs, dominate psychology. This distinction probably is unique
today to psychology and allied sciences, although it has a long history in medicine
(Bernard, 1927/1957). The two approaches differ in very important ways and by tradi-
tion. One of the major differences is the heavy reliance on inferential statistics in the
group designs than in small-N designs. Another important difference is the built-in
emphasis on replication and reproducibility of effects in small-N designs than in the
large-N group designs. These particular differences suggest a diametrically opposed
impact of the methodology crisis in the different specializations within psychology that
tend to adopt them, namely, group designs in cognitive psychology and small-N designs
in behavioral psychology. One could say without prejudice that what the one is doing or
experiencing because of the crisis is of no concern to the other, because of the apparent
gulf between the two approaches in psychology. In fact, however, behavior analysts have
been concerned and interested in the use of inferential statistics as attested to by the
debates, albeit from a behavioral perspective, on the pages of one of their “trade” journal,
namely, The Behavior Analyst (e.g., see Baron, 1999; Branch, 1999; Crosbie, 1999; Shull,
1999). The question is: if research method has been and continues to be the unifying force
that binds psychology together as a science, can we afford to remain dispassionately
indifferent to what goes on in the different domains of psychology?
There is a different kind of attention to the persistent crises of replication and
dependency on NHST in psychological research that is underway. Previously, there has
been an ongoing focus on the controversy of using and overusing, perhaps to the level of
abuse (cf. Goldstein, 1984), of NHST in psychology (Harlow, Mulaik, & Steiger, 1997;
Morrison & Henkel, 1970). Over the years, spanning many decades, many observers have
cautioned, campaigned, and repudiated the over-reliance on NHST from various back-
grounds in psychology (Falk & Greenbaum, 1995; Morrison & Henkel, 1970; Rozeboom,
1960) and beyond (e.g., Fidler et al., 2004; Kern, 2014). Arguments have ranged from firm
support for (Chow, 1998; Frisk, 1996; Hagen, 1997) to suggestion of outright banning of
NHST in psychological research (Schmidt & Hunter, 1997) and many more in between
(e.g., Cohen, 1994; Mulaik, Raju, & Harshman, 1997; Serlin & Lapsley, 1985). It is safe to
say that over half a century of clamors for change have yielded little or no change at all.
Until recently, it has been just talking points, cautionary notes, rebukes, but little to no
systematic action. As Thompson aptly noted, despite having devoted many pages over
decades in its publications (e.g., Kline, 2013), the American Psychological Association
(APA) official position as of the fourth edition of its Publication Manual amounted to
merely “encouraging” psychologists to report effect sizes (ESs) (Thompson, 1999, p. 68),
for example (see also Fidler, 2010; Finch, Cumming, & Thomason, 2001). Subsequently,
the fifth edition only provided tepid advocacy for the promotion of confidence interval
(CI), graphically and otherwise (Fidler, 2010). The latest edition, improved on these only
to the extent of specifying how to report CIs and ESs and emphasizing meta-analysis, and
thus provides, at best, only words of “encouragements” to authors (see Fidler, 2010, p. 2;
Thompson, 1999). In 2012, the Association for Psychological Science (APS) initiated
a different kind of advocacy efforts to promote replications and better statistical practices.
Two notable difference from previous attempts in the current efforts included 1) the
specific devotion of special issues in Perspectives in Psychological Science (PiPS) dedicated
to replicability and research practices in psychology (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012;
Spellman, 2012) and 2) the adoption of the New Statistics (e.g., Cumming, 2014a)
emphasizing the estimation approach over NHST in Psychological Science (PS).
Editorial determination at refreshingly tangible actions appears to be the hallmark of
the current efforts (Eich, 2014; Lindsay, 2015).
Prior to the inception of the efforts by the APS, others have reported on previous
reporting practices in psychology (e.g., Cumming et al., 2007a; Fidler et al., 2004; Finch
et al., 2001). Cumming et al., for example, found mixed results of reporting practices with
persistent heavy use of NHST, low use of 95% confidence intervals (CI), increased use of
standard error (SE) of the mean over CI, and continued use of unidentified error bars on
graphs. Finch et al. (2004) reported similar trends in comparing authors who did or did not
publish in Memory & Cognition during the editorship of Geoffrey Loftus who tried to
enforce best practices in statistical reporting in that journal. Whereas 95% of these authors’
works reported NHST, only 5% reported CIs. They noted that “only around 22% of articles
[included CIs], about 40% . . . rely onNHSTwithout interval estimation or visual displays of
data, and another 36% included conventional figures without error bars” (Finch et al., 2004,
p. 320). Finch et al. (2001) showed that historically entrenched practices of using relative as
opposed to exact p-values continued to encourage verbal fudging of reporting nonsignifi-
cance (such as in “approaching significance,” p. 201) and poor reporting and interpretation
of CIs in journals like Journal of Applied Psychology.
Many observers of the various reporting practices of psychological research, including
those of the aforementioned reports, have been critical about such practices while recom-
mending alternative, specific best practices. Prominent among these alternative best practices,
besides the strenuous objections to NHST, but some related to it, are: (1) report power
(needed with or without NHST for group designs); (2), if you have to at all, report exact p, not
relative p; (3) report ESs (as encouraged in the 6th edition of the APA manual); (4) use and
identify error bars on graphs and do not confuse SDs, SEs, and CIs in doing so; (5) report CI
instead of SE for inference purposes; and (6) report and interpret CIs instead of reporting
p-values. Two of these best practices deserve further comments. First, ESs are not limited to
the standard familiar ones like Cohen’s d or Hedge’s g. According to Cumming (2014b), ESs
also include the mean and mean difference, percentage and percentage change, correlation
(e.g., Pearson’s r), proportion variance (e.g., R2, η2, ω2, etc.), regression slope (b or β),
etc. Second, often there is confusion about reporting and use of the SD, the SE, and CIs,
perhaps because they are typically represented on graphs, albeit erroneously, as measures of
variability on point estimates, such as the mean. Of the three, only the SD is a descriptive
statistic of the sample, however; the CI is inferential, and SE is neither inferential. The SE is
the SD of the sampling distribution of the sample means, about twice the margin of error (or
MOE). The CI, in contrast, represents theMOE below and above the point estimate and tells
us something about where the population mean might reside, among other things (see
Cumming, 2014b). Reporting choices among these statistics, therefore, are important in
illuminating current reporting practices.
How widespread the problematic practices continue to be since 2012 when the APS
reform efforts became widely publicized, therefore, is of interest. This is particularly so, in
light of the seriousness of these efforts and the new rigor in their pursuit. Indeed, for example,
a more recent study reported continued use of the notion of “marginally significant” to
describe “p values between .05 and .10” in various psychological fields (Olsson-Colletine, van
Assen, & Hartgerink, 2019, p. 1). What sorts of impact are these efforts having on reporting
practices? Besides the editorial efforts noted above, there have been, in addition, recent
educational efforts in support of changing these practices. At annual meetings of the APS,
workshops on the new statistics, on open science fora, and on data handling, are frequently
offered. How effective have they been? There are different approaches to answer such
question. One way is to explore reporting practices of authors of articles appearing in various
psychological journals for an extended period, including the period in question. This option
would require in depth analyses of reporting practices say, over a decade, to examine yearly
changes in those practices inmultiple journals. Needless to say, that would require a great deal
of resources in time and effort. Another approach is to select a few journals with varying
diversity of focus and take a snapshot of the practices in select volumes. In the present study,
we adopted the latter approach, examining research articles published in two behavioral
(Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior (JEAB) and Behavioral Processes (BP)) and
two cognitive (Cognition and PS) journals right before (2011) and soon after (2015) the APS
efforts became pronounced in 2012. We selected the first three journals based on the
predominant subject-matter focus of the publications, two being behavioral and one being
cognitive, whereas we chose the last one because, in addition to being mainly cognitive in
focus, it provides a direct comparison to the other three non-APS journals, as a primary
publication of the APS, the main organization advocating the current reform efforts in
psychology.
The rationale for examining behavioral vs. cognitive journals is twofold. First, behavioral
research tends to emphasize replication by virtue of the inherent comparisons required for
experimental manipulations in small-N designs (Sidman, 1960; see Imam, 2018). For that
reason, one would not expect the replication crisis in psychology at large to manifest in the
area of behavioral research. It remains an empirical question, however, especially in light of
the next consideration. Second, to the extent that authors publishing in the behavioral
journals may deploy statistical analyses such as NHST that is commonly used in group
designs (e.g., Zimmermann, Watkins, & Poling, 2015), in what way(s) have the concerns
and tribulations about the over-reliance on NHST in psychology in general, with their
pertinent recommended solutions, influenced reporting practices in behavioral research?
The present study examined how reporting of replication and statistics may have
changed, in the year immediately preceding the wide dissemination of the APS efforts in
2012 and three years after, to assess the comparative impact of the efforts. We considered
reports of replication, or its absence, of NHST in general, and of other specific statistical
measures and considerations often recommended as essential to proper understanding of
the role of statistics in psychological research; the latter included power, the use of error
bars on graphs, differentiating SDs and SEs and reporting CIs, and ESs, including those
identified above for best practices. As indicated in the preceding paragraph, if replication
is central to behavioral analytic research, one would expect superior replication reporting
in the behavioral journals compared to the cognitive journals, on the one hand, and less
reporting of statistical measures and practices that are more germane to group designs
commonly used in the rest of psychology, on the other hand. If the APS efforts are having
an impact, reporting and practices should reflect the recommended solutions typically
offered to researchers in extant psychology; namely, more power-, CI-, error-bar report-
ing and less NHST-statistics in the mainstream cognitive journals.
Method
Data collection and analyses
We examined 1,157 research articles from four journals in psychology (see Table 1).
Articles and entries in these journals that were excluded from analysis variously included
memorials, corrigenda, errata and retractions, acknowledgements and letters, book reviews,
technical notes, preface, simulations, some perspectives and commentaries, theoretical and
review articles, editorials, and publisher note.
We tallied frequencies of “replication” and mentions of associated terms, including
“replicable,” “replicability,” “reproducible,” and “reproducibility,” in the journals in the
2011 and 2015 volumes, excluding studies reporting “statistical replications.” This approach
is similar to that of Makel, Plucker, and Hegarty (2012) in which they used the “replicat*
search term. A hit on a search term in the present study triggered a check on whether an
actual replication was conducted or not, and tallies of direct vs. systematic replications were
made respectively (see supplements). In addition, tallies of various NHST and estimation
statistics included, but were not limited to, the mean (M), median, and mode, the standard
deviation (SD), range, minimum and maximum, proportions, and percentages (descriptive
Table 1. Summary of the journals analyzed with some NHST statistics including total t, F, others (χ2, z, and
Mann Whitney U).
NHST Statistics
Journal Year No. of Articles No. of Vol/Issues t F Others
Cognitive Journals
COG 2011 149 2 9 11 0
2015 196 2 18 19 12
Total 345 4 24 30 12
PS 2011 234 3 34 73 26
2015 181 12 82 113 92
Total 415 15 116 186 118
Behavioral Journals
JEAB 2011 43 4 82 104 54
2015 50 12 130 117 85
Total 93 16 212 221 139
BP 2011 127 1 (12) 201 221 103
2015 177 1 (12) 199 190 115
Total 304 2 (24) 400 411 218
Grand Total 1157 752 848 487
Notes. COG: Cognition; PS: Psychological Science; JEAB: Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior; BP: Behavioural Processes
statistics); the χ2, z, MannWhitneyU, t, and F statistics, p-value (exact vs. relative), and power
(inferential statistics); and SE, CI, η2, partial η2, ω2, Cohen’s d, r, R2, and variance accounted
for (estimation approach). CI reporting tallies included interpretations of CI based on interval
bounds, interval width, CIs overlap, or non-zero overlap. Statistics encountered but not
counted included β, α, b, semi partial r2, RMSEA, MSE, Spearman rho, Cohen’s k, prep,
andW.
To tally power reporting, search words included “power,” “sample size,” and/or “effect
size.” Explicit statements of power determinations were counted for each experiment in an
article, usually before the results section in each journal. References to power or power-related
issues, usually in results and/or discussion sections, counted as implicit reporting of power
(see Fidler et al., 2004) and were specifically not counted as power (Simmons, Nelson, &
Simonsohn, 2011). Many studies referred to sample-size determinations in terms of “same as
in previous studies,” referencing specific studies; these counted in a separate category reported
here as SAP in the present study. A number of articles reported using “pilot” studies to
determine sample size; one article employed “pretesting,” and another used “post hoc.”
Encounters of “sample size determined in advance” without specifying how, or manipula-
tions, statistical and otherwise, performed to “increase” power, did not count for power
reporting. Tallies also included use of graphs and error bars, as well as reporting of missing
data. The supplements accompanying themanuscript present the detail tallies for all journals.
To analyze the data, we computed the proportion of articles reporting each measure of
interest and their respective 95% CIs using the ESCI program for the latest edition of
Cumming’s textbook (Cumming & Calin-Jageman, 2017), specifically the Two-Proportions
tab of Chapters 10–16 of the software. The tab also allowed for computation of proportion
differences for a given comparison of proportions of a measure. We report both of these in
either graphical (for visual comparisons) and/or tabular (for completeness) forms. Two types
of graphs are presented; first, those for presentation of proportions of reporting practices for
each of the journals (Figures 1, 4, and 5) and those for pairwise comparisons of various
journals on different measures (Figures 2, 3, and 6–7). Asterisks on the first set of graphs
indicate proportion differences for the tagged comparisons did not contact or overlap with
zero on the difference axis and therefore considered significantly different.
Results
In the graphs depicting differences in point and interval estimates throughout the paper, if the
95% CIs on the proportion differences do not overlap zero on the difference axis, the
difference indicates a significant difference (Cumming & Calin-Jageman, 2017). The results
are presented separately for replication reporting and statistical reporting.
Replication reporting
Reporting of replication was multidimensional across the four journals with three replication
categories (none, actual, and a mention) in two years (2011 and 2015) as shown in Figure 1;
the actual replications combined direct and systematic replications tallies. As such, multiple
layers of comparisons are possible. First, Figure 1 shows that all journals reported higher no
replications than actual replications and replicationmentions, respectively, with the exception
of JEAB in 2011 recording the highest actual replications compared to all other journals in
both years. Figure 1 also shows that the journals reported at least 25% replicationmentions in
2011, while reporting above 25% in 2015, except PS reporting only 9% replication
mentions. Second, various other comparisons of proportions of the replication categories
for 2011 and 2015 across the behavioral and cognitive journals revealed important differ-
ences, some of which are shown in separate data sets presented in the appendix. For example,
data for the individual journals compared by publication year showed that only JEAB
recorded a significant decline in actual replications in 2015 whereas PS recorded
a significant decrease in no replications with a corresponding increase in actual replications
and replication mentions in 2015; all other comparisons showed no significant differences
(see Figure 1A in the appendix). Figure 2 compares the replication categories by year of
publication for each journal. Figure 2 shows that whereas reporting differences in JEAB in
2011 were significant for no replication vs. actual replications on the one hand, and actual
replications vs. replication mentions on the other, none of the differences in 2015 were
significant. The significant differences in JEAB in 2011 both favored actual replications. In
contrast to JEAB, all the differences in replication reporting in both years were significant in
BP; none of them, however, favored actual replications or replicationmentions. The samewas
true for bothCognition and PS in both years, except for the replication reporting difference in
both years for PS in which actual replications surpassed replication mentions, but more so in
2015 (see Figure 2).
Figure 1. Proportion of articles (and their 95% CIs) reporting no replications, actual replications, and
mentions of replication in the behavioral (left panel) and cognitive (right panel) journals published in 2011
and 2015. * indicates significant comparisons based on proportion differences during each publication year
for each journal.
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Figure 2. Cross comparisons of proportion of articles reporting no replication (None) vs. replication
mention (RM) (top rows) no replication (None) vs. actual replications (AR) (middle row), and actual vs.
replication mentions (bottom row) in all journals showing their proportion differences with the respec-
tive 95% CIs, which signify significant differences when they do not overlap zero on the difference axis.
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Figure 3. Cross comparisons of proportion of articles reporting no replication (top) replication
mentions (middle), and actual replications (bottom) in BP vs. cognition (left of left-half panel) and
BP vs. PS (right of left-half panel) and in JEAB vs. cognition (left of right-half panel) and JEAB vs. PS
(right of right-half panel) showing their proportion differences with the respective 95% CIs, which
signify significant differences when they do not overlap zero on the difference axis.
Comparisons of proportions of replication reporting by replication categories
between the two behavioral and the two cognitive journals, respectively, revealed
that the behavioral journals showed that reporting of no replication was significantly
higher in BP than in JEAB but reporting of actual replications was higher in JEAB
than in BP in both years (see Figure 2A, left panel in the appendix). Thus, although
JEAB reported significantly more actual replications than BP in both years, the
difference in replication reporting markedly declined in 2015. Whereas no replica-
tion reporting was significantly lower in PS than in Cognition in 2015 and in both
years for replication mentions, actual replications were significantly higher in PS
than in Cognition in 2015 (see Figure 2A, right panel, in the appendix).
Figure 3 presents cross comparisons between JEAB and the cognitive journals on the one
hand, and between BP and the cognitive journals, on the other. Cross-comparisons between
JEAB and Cognition showed that reporting no replication was significantly higher in
Cognition than in JEAB in 2011, whereas actual replication reporting was higher in JEAB
than in Cognition in both years (see Figure 3, left half). Cross-comparisons between JEAB
and PS showed that all categories of replication-reporting differences were significant only
in 2011, with higher no-replication difference in PS than in JEAB, but higher replication
mentions and actual replications in JEAB than in PS. In 2015, there were virtually no
differences on the three categories of replication reporting between the two journals (see
Figure 3, right of left-half). Thus, whereas JEAB reported more actual replications than
Cognition in both years, the difference not only declined in comparison to Cognition
(Figure 3, left half,), it virtually disappeared in comparison to PS in 2015 (Figure 3, right
of left-half). Finally, actual and no replication reporting were not different between BP and
Cognition in both years (see Figure 3, left of right-half) and between BP and PS in 2011
(Figure 3, right half); replication mentions in 2011 were significantly higher in PS than in
Figure 4. Proportions and proportion difference (with their respective 95% CI) of articles reporting exact (E)
and relative (R) p-values across the behavioral journals and cognitive journals published in 2011 and 2015.
BP. In 2015, however, PS recorded significantly more actual replications and less no
replication than BP did (Figure 3, right half).
All in all, then, replication reporting across the two years indicate two notable results. First,
there was a decline in actual replications in 2015 in the lone star on replications in 2011,
namely JEAB. Second, there was an increase in actual replications and replicationmentions in
PS in 2015.
Statistical reporting
Various statistical reporting patterns are discernable from the results, including on NHST,
power, exact vs. relative p-value, ES measures, SD vs. SE, CIs and error bars on graphs. As
shown in Table 1, reporting of key NHST statistics such as the t- and F-tests, as well the
others including χ2, z, and Mann Whitney U tests, increased in all journals except in BP in
2015 compared to 2011. For the cognitive journals, Cognition recorded greater increases in
reporting of these statistics than PS in 2015, 50%, 58%, and 100% vs. 41%, 65%, and 28%,
Figure 5. Proportion of articles reporting various effect size measures including mean, mean difference
(MnDiff), proportion and percentage (Prop/%), odds ratio and relative risk (OR/RR), correlation (r), R2 and
variance accounted for (R2/VAC), η2 (eta2), partial η2 (part. eta2), and Cohen’s d in the behavioral journals
(left panel) and the cognitive journals (right panel) published in 2011 and 2015. * indicates significant
differences (see Table 1A in the appenndix for these and other differences discussed in text).
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Figure 6. Proportions and proportion differences (with their respective 95% CI) of articles reporting
SDs and SEs in the respective behavioral and cognitive journals (left of each panel) and their
comparisons (right of each panel) during the 2011 and 2015 publication years.
Behavioral Journals Cognitive Journals 
JEAB         Cognition 
BP PS 
JEAB vs. BP (2011)       Cognition vs. PS (2011) 






Figure 7. Proportions and proportion differences (with their respective 95% CI) of articles reporting CIs
in the respective behavioral and cognitive journals (left panel) and their comparisons (right panel)
published in 2011 and 2015.
respectively, for t, F, and others. For the behavioral journals, JEAB recorded greater
increases than BP in 2015, 63%, 88%, and 64% vs. .99% decrease, .86% decrease, and .9%
increase, respectively, for t, F, and others. Collectively, the four journals showed 76%, 93%,
and 60% respectively for t, F, and the other statistical tests.
Power
Despite the substantial amount of reporting of the NHST statistics, reporting of statistical
power usage, comparatively, were minimal (see Table 2). Table 2 shows that the generally
low levels of power reporting nevertheless reflect increased reporting of the various
power formats from 2011 to 2015, especially in the explicit, implicit, and same as in
previous study (SAPS) categories; JEAB was an exception to these, showing no reporting
at all of any of the categories except implicit in 2015. Table 2 also shows that whereas
Cognition and PS reported more implicit power than explicit power in 2011, they
reported the latter more than the former in 2015; both behavioral journals did not report
explicit power at all in both years.
Exact vs. relative p-values
All journals reported both exact and relative p-values in both years about equally; only
the reporting for 2011 in PS was significantly different with more relative than exact
p-values reported. A comparison of relative vs. exact p-value across all journals showed
a small but significant difference in reporting of relative over exact p-value as shown in
Figure 4. None of the proportion differences on exact vs. relative p-value reporting across
publication years in all journals was significant.
Effect size measures
Reporting of the various ESs mentioned in the introduction showed interesting com-
monalities and differences across the four journals. For one, all journals reported the
Table 2. Power reporting in each journal in 2011 and 2015 showing the numbers reported explicitly
(explicit), implicitly (implicit), in terms of same as in previous study (SAPS), pilot, or others (pretesting
and post hoc).
Power Reporting
Journals Year Explicit Implicit SAPS Pilot Others
Cognitive Journals
COG 2011 1 8 0 0 0
2015 13 14 10 1 0
Total 14 22 10 1 0
PS 2011 7 20 0 0 0
2015 62 40 41 9 2
Total 69 60 41 9 2
Behavioral Journals
JEAB 2011 0 0 0 0 0
2015 0 4 0 0 0
Total 0 4 0 0 0
BP 2011 0 2 0 0 0
2015 0 8 1 0 0
Total 0 10 1 0 0
Grand Total 83 96 52 10 2
mean and proportions/percentages a lot more than all other ESs in both years as shown in
Figure 5, although only the proportion/percentage decline for JEAB and increases for
Cognition and PS across 2011 and 2015 were significantly different. For another, the other
ESs were reported relatively less frequently across all journals except for PS in which the
reporting of r, partial η2 and Cohen’s d was comparatively higher than the other journals
(see Figure 5). Of these other ESs, partial η2 reporting was significantly better in 2015
than 2011 for Cognition, PS, and BP, but only so for Cohen’s d in PS and BP, and only η2
for BP. In addition, notably, there was virtual absence of reporting of η2, partial η2 and
Cohen’s d in the behavioral journals (see Figure 5, left panel) compared to the cognitive
journals (see Figure 5, right panel) in 2011. The increased reporting in the behavioral
journals in 2015 were only significant for BP. The two cognitive journals reported these
effect sizes in both years, mostly showing increases in 2015 over 2011, but only those for
partial η2 in both journals and Cohen’s d in PS were significant (see Figure 5, right panel).
Table 1A in the appendix presents the proportion differences and their CIs that confirm
these findings.
Standard deviation and standard error
Although the two cognitive journals reported more SDs in both years compared to the
two behavioral journals, the proportion differences in the two years for all four journals
were not significant except for PS, which recorded significantly more SDs in 2015 than in
2011 (see Figure 6, left panels). In both years, JEAB reported significantly more SDs than
PB, but the PS reported significantly more SDs than Cognition only in 2015 (see Figure 6,
right panels). Figure 6 also shows that whereas there was no difference in SE-reporting in
both years in the cognitive journals, there was significantly more SE reporting in 2015
than in 2011 in BP (left panels). Reporting of SE was significantly higher in PS than in
Cognition in both years, but only so for BP compared to JEAB in 2015 (see Figure 6, right
panels). Although the two cognitive journals reported CIs more in 2015 than in 2011, PS
reported CIs substantially more in 2015 than in 2011.
Confidence interval
Although CI reporting in JEAB was virtually nil in both years, of the two behavioral
journals, only BP recorded more CI reporting in 2015 than in 2011 (see left panels,
Figure 7). In both years, BP recorded significantly more CIs than JEAB, whereas PS did
so over Cognition only in 2015 (see right panels, Figure 7).
The details of the CI reporting in these journals presented in Table 3 depict
various outcomes. The table shows that more experiments in all four journals
reported CIs in 2015 than in 2011. Collectively, the four journals reported more
CIs in text (166/361 or 46%) than graphically (136/361 or 38%), with the least
reporting in tabular form (59/361 or 16%). Individually, whereas Cognition reported
more CIs graphically (8/12 or 67%) than both in text and in tables (2/12 or 17%
each) in 2011, there were more textual (24/44 or 55%) than graphical (12/44 or
27%), then tabular (8/44 or 18%) in 2015. In PS, similarly, there was more CI
reporting graphically (15/27 or 56%) than textual (10/27 or 37%) and tabular (2/27
or 7%) reporting in 2011, but more textual (120/241 or 50%) than graphical (81/241
or 33%), then tabular (40/241 or 17%) in CI reporting in 2015.
Together, the cognitive journals tended to report CIs textually (156/324 or 48%) than
graphically (116/324 or 36%) or in tables (52/324 or 16%). In contrast, the behavioral
journals tended to report CIs graphically (20/37 or 54%) than in tabular (7/37 or 19%) or
textual (10/37 or 27%) forms. Whereas CI reporting in JEAB was virtually nil with only
one reporting in 2011 and very limited with only three in 2015, it was a little better in BP
in both years. All CI reporting in 2011 was graphical (4/4 or 100%) in BP, in contrast to
2015 with 47% (14/30) graphical, 30% (9/30) tabular, and 23% (7/30) textual CI reporting.
Of the total CI reporting in each journal, in 2011, there was only one (8% and 3%
respectively) CI interpretation in Cognition and PS, increasing to seven and 15 (16% and
6%, respectively) in 2015; BP reported only one and three representing 25% and 17%,
respectively, in 2011 and 2015. Collectively, CI interpretation was more non-zero (62%)
than overlap (24%) interpretations, and least based on interval bounds or width inter-
pretations, at 10% each, in all four journals. Whereas cognitive journals recorded more
non-zero (67%) than any other interpretations, the behavioral journals reported using
more overlap interpretations (60%) than any other form of interpretation.
Error bars
Error bars appeared on graphs in both the cognitive and the behavioral journals, but
on some more than on others; generally more in the cognitive than in the beha-
vioral journals. For the behavioral journals, in both years, error bars appeared
significantly more on BP than on JEAB graphs. In contrast, for the cognitive
journals, graphs in Cognition contained more error bars than those in PS, but
significantly so only in 2011 (see Figure 8, right panels). Figure 8 also shows that
the proportion difference in error-bar usage in both years for each journal except
PS, were not significant, although there was significant increase in error-bar use in
PS in 2015 compared to 2011, as shown in the right panels of Figure 8.
Table 3. Confidence interval (CI) reporting in each journal showing the number of experiments
reporting, reporting format (graphical, tabular, or textual), and the number interpreting CIs (Total)
in the form of interval bounds (IB), interval width (IW), overlap (OL), or non-zero (NZ) interpretation in
2011 and 2015.
CI Reporting CI Interpretation
Journals Year No. of Experiments Graph Table Text IB IW OL NZ Total (%)
Cognitive Journals
COG 2011 12 8 2 2 0 0 0 1 1(8)
2015 36 12 8 24 1 2 1 3 7(16)
Total 48 20 10 26 1 2 1 4 8(14)
PS 2011 26 15 2 10 0 0 0 1 1(3)
2015 181 81 40 120 2 1 1 11 15(6)
Total 207 96 42 130 2 1 1 12 16(4)
Behavioral Journals
JEAB 2011 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1(100)
2015 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0(0)
Total 3 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 1(100)
BP 2011 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1(25)
2015 25 14 7 9 0 0 3 0 3(17)
Total 30 18 7 9 0 0 3 1 4(12)
Grand Total 288 136 59 166 3 3 5 18 29(8)
Behavioral Journals Cognitive Journals 
JEAB         Cognition 
BP PS 
JEAB vs. BP (2011)       Cognition vs. PS (2011) 






Figure 8. Proportions and proportion differences (with their respective 95% CI) of articles reporting
error bars on graphs in the respective behavioral and cognitive journals (left panel) and their
comparisons (right panel) published in 2011 and 2015.
Discussion
Has the recent APS efforts on promoting better replication and statistical reporting
practices began to have a demonstrable impact on journal publications in psychology?
How widespread is such an impact? The present study adopted a snapshot approach to
answer these questions, by selecting a couple of behavioral and of cognitive journals (one of
which is an APS publication) published before and after the APS efforts became widely
disseminated in 2012. Of the four journals included in the present study, pre-initiative
(2011) reporting of actual replications was highest only for JEAB; post-initiative (2015),
however, this reversed in favor of PS only, as all the other journals declined in their
reporting of actual replications in 2015 compared to 2011. Across the years, actual replica-
tions remained high for JEAB than for Cognition, although less so in 2015 than in 2011. In
all cross-comparisons of actual replications, replications tended to be lower in Cognition
than in all other journals, except in BP; the huge difference in actual replications between
JEAB and PS in 2011 had collapsed by 2015 and the gap in actual replications between PS
and BP in 2011 grew in 2015.
One cannot help but notice the paradox of JEAB recording less replication than PS in 2015
given JEAB’s reputation on use of small-N designs that requires replicating experimental
conditions as a matter of course. Whereas JEAB’s replication decline that year remains
inexplicable, PS’s replication increase is attributable to the current reform efforts of the
APS. In both years, the decline in actual replications recorded in 2015 by the other three
journals dampens the good news in the burst in actual replications observed in PS, being the
only APS journal included in the present study. The relatively high levels of mentions of
replication in these three journals in both years did not make up for this laxity in actual
replications; if only actual replications could rise to the levels of replication mentions!
As indicated by Makel et al. (2012), it is difficult to characterize accurately the level of
replication in the literature if authors do not refer to the fact that their study was actually
a replication study. Relying heavily on search terms could be a shortcoming of the present
study, although actual replications were assessed during a hit on the search terms. Actual
replications, therefore, provided an important index on the impact of the APS efforts on
replication reports. In this regard, the decline in actual replications in JEAB in 2015 is
alarming in light of the emphases usually placed on replications in behavior analytic research.
A small-N approach to research would, more likely than not, warrant a declaration of
replication of experimental conditions in the course of describing the procedures. The decline
in actual replications that year, therefore, is not likely due to nondeclaration by authors, as
implied byMakel et al.’s noted observation. Perhaps the culprit is more likely the growing use
of human participants in behavior analytic research that may have been accompanied by the
use of group designs being published in JEAB that peaked during the 2010s (Zimmermann
et al., 2015). Indeed, Zimmermann et al. reported a concomitant increase in the use of
inferential (NHST) statistics in the journal as well. Whether 2015 was just an aberration in
JEAB regarding the recorded decline in actual replications reporting remains an empirical
question.
Contrary to what one might expect given the common differences outlined in the
introduction between cognitive and behavioral approaches in psychology, the results of
the present study showed substantial reporting of NHST statistics in the behavioral
journals in both years in the present study (see Table 1). In addition, the generally high
reporting of NHST across all journals of 76%, 93%, and 60% for t, F, and the other
statistics surveyed in the present study, and the percent of F-reporting in particular is
consistent with those reported by Finch et al. (2004) for Memory & Cognition.
Furthermore, all journals, behavioral and cognitive alike, showed increased reporting
of HNST statistics in 2015 compared to 2011 and yet with little corresponding increase in
reporting of power, especially in the behavioral journals; at least, the cognitive journals
relatively increased reporting of various categories of power. The generally low levels of
power reporting are similar to those reported by Fidler et al. (2004) for two medical
journals with similarly high NHST reporting records. Given the aforementioned sub-
stantially high reporting of NHST statistics in the behavioral journals in both years,
consistent with previous reports of growing use of group designs in JEAB in recent years
(Zimmermann et al., 2015), for example, it is concerning that power reporting in the
behavioral journals were virtually non-existent except for the implicit category for BP.
The virtual absence of power reporting in the behavioral journals perhaps may be due to
the generally ad hoc nature of the use of NHST and/or inadequate training in the use of
group-design statistics in behavioral psychology, which usually is more disposed to
small-N design approach to the evaluations of data (Gast & Ledford, 2014; Sidman, 1960).
All journals reported p-values as exact or relative values indiscriminately in both years,
except PS reporting more relative than exact p-values in 2011. The indiscriminate
reporting of exact and relative p-values remains problematic across the board and is
consistent with Finch et al.’s (2001) report of practices in the Journal of Applied
Psychology. Authors seem not to have gotten the message about the oft-cited preference
for exact p-values as best practice in reporting NHST statistics. This is one area of best
practices where editorial imperative (Imam, 2018) can have an immediate impact by
simply requesting reporting of exact ps.
Of the nonstandardized ESs recorded in the present study, both behavioral and cognitive
journals showed high frequency reporting of the mean and proportion/percentage mea-
sures in both years compared to all other ES measures, although JEAB, Cognition, and PS
involved significant differences in these measures. These results are very consistent with
those reported particularly for Epidemiology and in part for the American Journal of Public
Health by Fidler et al. (2004); in the latter journal, there was less reporting of means and
mean differences than in Epidemiology. The three standardized ESs (η2, partial η2, and
Cohen’s d) recorded in the present study appear to have revealed better prospects in
showing increases in 2015 compared to 2011, especially in BP and Cognition, but particu-
larly in PS, in support of the current efforts initiated by the APS.
The common refrain about the use of SDs and SEs, in text or on graphs by authors, is
that they tend to be used interchangeably as measures of variability and as if they are both
descriptive statistics (see Cumming, Fidler, & Vaux, 2007b). As Cumming et al. eluci-
dated, however, one (SD) is a descriptive statistic and the other (SE) is neither descriptive
nor inferential, only CI is inferential. Accordingly, use of error bars on graphs can be very
confusing and deceptive, therefore, especially when they are not identified appropriately,
if at all. In the present study, only BP and PS showed significant increases respectively in
SE- and SD- reporting in 2015 compared to 2011. Although error-bar reporting was
recorded by most of the journals in the present study, they were not as high as those
reported previously for various journals by Cumming et al. (2007a). With respect to CI
reporting, whereas JEAB reporting of CI was abysmally low at near-zero in both years, the
other three journals increased CI reporting in 2015 over 2011, the greatest increase being
in PS, a most encouraging development in light of the journal’s home and providing
further evidence for effectiveness of the current reform efforts. Although the present
analysis did not differentiate reporting of SDs and SEs by graphical, textual, or tabular
formats as was done with CIs, the use of error bars other than CI remains a concerning
practice in light of persistent recommendations to the contrary (Cumming, Fidler,
Kalinowski, & Lai, 2012; Cumming et al., 2007a; Cumming & Finch, 2005). It is one
thing to use error bars at all and another to identify what they represent on the graphs
they accompany. Yet another though, and perhaps more importantly, is the preference
for error bars to be CI rather than SE (see Cumming, 2009), or anything else for that
matter, due to what Cumming et al. refer to as its “inferential information” value (2012,
p. 144). That CIs are not “descriptive” statistics as SDs are, needs better appreciation in
psychological research reporting and cannot be overemphasized (see Cumming et al.,
2007b). Finally, CI interpretations were largely of the nonzero variety in the two cognitive
journals that showed an increase in CI-interpretation reporting in 2015 in the present
study.
The foregoing suggests that whereas there have been certain areas of improvement in
reporting of both replication and statistical results in both the cognitive and the beha-
vioral journals examined in the present study, a number of areas remain problematic
toward achieving best practices in psychological science reporting. Together, they impli-
cate collective lines of action by relevant institutions and/or organizations in psychology
(see Imam, 2018). For example, the Loftus editorial experience inMemory & Cognition of
having to correct authors’ errors on submissions (Fidler et al., 2004) reveals the limits of
rules and rule-governed behaviors compared to contingency-managed behavior; what is
needed is beyond editorial policies (e.g., Fan & Thompson, 2001) and practices. The APA
Manual and an editorial policy represent rules that alone or together are inadequate in
maintaining sustained impact on reporting practices (see Fidler et al., 2004). Editorial
accept-reject decisions on manuscripts represent the point of exerting contingency on
what is appropriate or acceptable to the research community. There have to be con-
sequences as a bridge between the rules and the outcomes or practices. Debate and focus
should be on identifying effective strategies for contingency management at all levels,
from the classroom to the grant funding bodies. Lilienfeld (2017) is exemplary on
delineating what goes on in awarding grants, just as Koole and Lakens (2012) have
outlined workable incentive regimes that would promote replications in extant psycho-
logical research. Ator (1999) provides cogent examples why there might be a drift, even in
behavior analysis at that, to the adoption of NHST. Pinpointing what works and how
well, to what is the best way to advance the science of psychology regardless of its various
domains and subdivisions is what is required at this juncture. Deliberate outreach also is
called for in the current efforts in light of increasing use of NHST by authors publishing
in behavioral journals such as JEAB (see Zimmermann et al., 2015), lest there remain
pockets of resistance in adopting acceptable NHST practices that may linger.
Furthermore, efforts have to extend to training that promotes curricula emphases (e.g.,
Fidler, 2010) for both current and future researchers in psychology and associated
disciplines, including undergraduate and graduate training, in order to ensure adequate
acquisition of desirable requisite research behaviors and reporting practices.
The results of the present study also suggest that the new efforts of the APS are 
beginning to have some impact as illustrated by some increased reporting of replications 
especially in PS, of CIs in all four journals, and of error bars on graphs in Cognition and 
BP. Thus, change appears to be happening already, but it should not be limited to the 
pages of APS journals. A concerted effort is required to expand the reach of the impact of 
the new approaches spearheaded by the APS to tackling the menace that NHST poses to 
psychological science. All psychologists in all domains of psychology should own these 
efforts and become advocates for these new practices in a sustainable version. Only then 
can psychology as a discipline hope to survive the scourge of mindless applications of 
NHST to the design, analysis, and interpretation of psychological research. The fact is 
that, contrary to popular believe, as noted earlier, behavior analysts have been engaged in 
the debates on the use of inferential statistics and how it impacts psychological research 
(e.g., Baron, 1999; Branch, 1999; Crosbie, 1999; Shull, 1999). As modern psychology 
struggles to find and consolidate its new identity on its quest for self-examination and 
self-discovery (see Barrett, 2016, for example), at some point, psychologists have to come 
to grips with whether and when experimental control (Perone, 1999) weighs more than 
statistical control in psychological research. Future research on topics like this should 
consider a look at other journals in the field that might shed further light on the growth 
and advancement of best practices in conducting and reporting sound researchin psy-
chological science.
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Figure 1A. Comparisons of proportion of articles reporting no replication, replication mention, and
actual replications in the two behavioral journals (left panel) and the two cognitive journals (right
panel) across the two publication years (2011 vs. 2015) showing their proportion differences with the
respective 95% CIs, which signify significant differences when they do not overlap zero on the
difference axis.
Figure 2A. Cross comparisons of proportion of articles reporting no replication (top) replication
mentions (middle), and actual replications (bottom) in JEAB vs. BP (left panel) and cognition vs. PS
(right panel) showing their proportion differences with the respective 95% CIs, which signify sig-
nificant differences when they do not overlap zero on the difference axis.
